SURVEILLANCE DETECTION

How To Detect if You’re Under Surveillance

This article will introduce a number of techniques to detect if someone is conducting surveillance on you. Before we get started, I want to make it clear that my knowledge and experience in this come from the private sector, and not from any clandestine government agency work. Though the principles and techniques I’ll be discussing can be pretty effective across the board, I’m not trying to teach anyone how to detect government sector surveillance teams. Since my own experience involves non-vehicular surveillance detection, this will be the focus of this article. The techniques I’ll be presenting here have been successfully tested during training and successfully applied in actual, real-life situations.
Surveillance detection on yourself
If you want to detect surveillance covertly (which doesn’t always have to be the case, by the way), you’ll want to avoid a situation where you’re constantly looking behind you, or otherwise have your head on a swivel when you’re out and about. The way to avoid this is to narrowing down the areas you’ll be paying attention to, and to figure out what it is you should be looking for.
Where to look? 
The short answer is that it depends on where you happen to be, and whether you’re static or mobile:
  • Static surveillance:

If you’re static, then there’s a good chance that surveillance on you is also going to be static. Let’s take the two most likely static locations where someone might be able to find you – your home and your workplace. These are very important because if you’re being deliberately targeted, it’s a safe bet to assume that you’ll be found at these two locations on a regular, or even routine basis. In order to figure out where surveillance might be, what you’ll want to do is put yourself in the shoes of a potential surveillant, and try to figure out where you would be in order to covertly observe, say, the front door or driveway to your residence, and the main entrance or parking lot entrance to your workplace. Don’t just theorize about this, go ahead and actually try it out in the field. Are there any conveniently located cafes, busy intersections, bus or train stations, park or city benches, etc, that can give you both a good views of the location and sufficient cover for an extended period of time? If so, those are probably the locations you’d want to narrow your attention to, rather than try to cover the entire area. You’d also want to pay attention to the vehicles that are parked in spots that could potentially give them a good view (which is especially important if the area doesn’t have any good vantage points like the above mentioned). 

  • Mobile surveillance:

When conducting mobile surveillance, things become a bit more tricky, since surveillance might also need to go mobile. When in motion, the surveillant will usually want to be somewhere behind their target, and possibly behind and to the side. As the target moves forward on a typical city sidewalk, we can imagine potential surveillance zones (one behind the target and one behind but on the opposite side of the street) that will be “dragged” behind the target as it moves forward.
One of the most challenging things about mobile surveillance is what the surveillant needs to do when the target inevitably stops (either for a short or long period of time). This is because the dynamics switch from mobile to static, and then probably back to mobile again. These transitional points present real challenges for a surveillant – and therefore a detection opportunity for you – since the surveillant has to quickly and unexpectedly figure out how to keep track of their target without displaying any signs of surprise, confusion or nervousness.

How to spot surveillance
Now that we’ve started figuring out where to look, let’s talk about what to look for. Surveillance is primarily detected by noticing correlations to the target. Since in this case, you yourself are the target, the challenge is to spot if someone is correlating to you even though they’re purposely trying to do this behind you or at angles that are purposely outside your field of vision.
If you don’t want to reveal the fact that you’re looking for surveillance, you’re going to have to find ways to briefly glance at the above mentioned surveillance vantage points (the static and mobile ones) in order to detect if the same individual might be correlating to you in observation, movement and/or presence. In other words, can you see if someone is looking at you, moving and stopping when you move and stop, or simply present somehow in different locations you happen to be in over time? This is a bit tricky because most of the people who might be in potential vantage points or walking behind you on the street are not trying to surveil you. What distinguishes a surveilling from any other person out there is their deliberate and consistent attempt to observe where you are and where you’re going. The active correlations to you that a surveillant would have to therefore exhibit – especially over time and distance – are the most important indicators that can set surveillants apart from the rest of the people around. It’s not always easy to spot these correlations, but with practice, you can definitely get better at it.
The following techniques are designed to detect some of the classic indicators of surveillance. Keep in mind that this will probably not work if surveillance is conducted on a very high, government sector level or if you’re being surveilled by a coordinated team of operatives.
The good news is that you can practice these techniques anytime and anywhere you want – gradually getting better and more subtle at applying them. Static surveillance detection:

  1. When you’re at your house, place of work, restaurant, bar, etc, try to find ways to look outside (through windows, entrances, etc). Try to see if you can spot anyone in a vantage point, or just lingering around outside, who’s paying close attention to the entrance/exit you’re probably going to use.
  2. As you exit, use natural head movements and peripheral vision to see if anyone takes note of your exit and is transitioning, or preparing to transition, from static to mobile – thereby correlating to your own transition.

Mobile surveillance detection:

  1. As you move forward, try to find creative ways to take short glances at the area behind you and behind but on the other side of the street. A good way to do this is to periodically glance sideways (at stores, cars, people, etc) and use peripheral vision to look behind you. In order to better hide the fact that you’re doing this, try to make it visually obvious that you’re interested in what’s next to you rather than in what’s behind you (make it look like you’re interested in what’s in a store window, check out a flashy car or attractive person you walk by, etc). Try not to exaggerate these movements or look sideways too much. Keep it nice and natural. All you need are short glances from time to time.
  2. Use crosswalks, traffic lights or other common reasons for short stops to naturally look around, and therefore get an even better peripheral view of what’s behind you.
  3. Find legitimate looking reasons to cross to the other side of the street you’re walking on. The 90 degree turn you’ll be making puts the area that was behind you at a 90 degree angle to you, which you can more easily and subtly cover with peripheral vision when you cross the street, and/or wait to cross.
  4. Use short stops (to look at store windows, to wait for a walk signal, to check your phone, etc) to try to notice if anyone behind you has also abruptly transitioned from mobile to static (thereby correlating to your movements).
  5. Use longer stops (walking into a store, cafe, etc) to quickly look out the front window or door to see if anyone outside transitions from mobile to static, if anyone is observing the location you just walked into as they walk past in the direction you were going, or if anyone walks in after you. Then repeat the two steps mentioned in the static surveillance detection section above.
  6. Use little fakes to see if you can expose – and then detect – surveillance indicators. Keep it simple and subtle. Try doing things like the following:
  • Walk past a store with a window front, then stop, turn around and go back into the store.
  • gather up your things when you sit at a cafe, get up (as if you’re ready to leave), but then go and order something at the counter, or go to restroom before returning to your table or to a different table. There are, of course, many other such actions you can perform, and the point of all of them is to do something that would be hard for an observer to anticipate, and therefore more likely to cause less skilled surveillants to make a classic mistake. These mistakes usually take the form of nervous shuffling, doubletakes, uncomfortable shifts from static to mobile and back to static, etc, which create opportunities for you to spot the correlations. A surveillant will always correlate to their target, the question is how well they’ll be able to hide it, and actions like these can help flush correlations out into the open.

Many people like Hollywood-type ideas of using reflective surfaces, peepholes or gadgets to either surveill others of spot if you’re being surveilled yourself. I’m not a big fan of this. I’m not saying that it’s impossible to spot someone behind you by looking at a reflective surface but you probably won’t do well if you over-depend on such tactics. Also, staring into a window (or rather at what it’s reflecting) or using a blank screen of a laptop or cellphone to reflect what’s behind you is more noticeable than you might think. The same problem occurs when you go for cliché moves like purposely dropping something in order to look around when picking it up, or stopping to tie shoelaces (that are already tied).

Surveillance Detection Route (SDR)
An SDR is a predetermined route you can plan in advance which is designed to subtly expose hostile surveillance. It basically incorporates all the above mentioned tactics into one planned sequence by carefully selecting a route that should lure a surveillant into following you.
A typical route needs to start at a logical location where you’re expected to be found (your workplace is a good one). The route shouldn’t be one that you ordinarily take because if your surveillant already knows where you’re going, they won’t need to follow you (they could just wait for you there). Conversely, don’t make this route too strange because the surveillant might not be tempted to follow you, or worse, might suspect that it’s a trap. Make sure the route has both short and long stops (at predetermined locations where you already know what to look for, and where to look from). This will increase your probability of covertly detecting surveillance if it’s present.
A Very Brief Introduction To Surveillance Detection
Surveillance detection is the attempt to covertly determine if surveillance is being conducted, and if so, to collect general information on the surveillance entity – time, location, appearance, actions, and correlations to the target.
Before introducing some of the fundamentals of this subject, I would like to make some general clarifications about the intentions behind this article:

  • The field of surveillance detection is both wide and deep, and many of its fundamental principles admit of some exceptions, and even of exceptions to the exceptions. The purpose of this article is to provide a simple and brief introduction. It is therefore important to keep in mind that no such introduction can possibly contain the countless details and case-by-case contingencies and exceptions that exist.
  • No article, book, or seminar can be said to actually teach people how to perform surveillance detection. Though some of the wording in this article might seem instructional, please keep in mind that this is primarily for the sake of brevity. This brief introductory article is not intended to teach anyone how to execute surveillance detection operations.

A good way to begin explaining surveillance detection is to break it into its two components:
1. Understanding what to look for – what it is about other people that needs to be detected.
2. Understanding how and from where to look – what it is about the SD operator that will enable him/her to look for surveillance (SD location, appearance, demeanor, etc).

What to look for

Many people tend to think that in order to detect surveillance, one should try to spot anyone who seems suspicious, out of place, nervous, or taking a special interest in the asset in question (intently observing, taking notes, photographing, videotaping, etc). Though these factors might very well turn out to exist, it is important to note that rather obvious indicators of this sort will only be detected if the level at which the surveillance is being carried out is low. In other words, the very first thing that a well trained surveillance operative will learn is how to NOT display any of the above indicators. We can always hope for easily detectable surveillance indicators (and should always look for them), but we would be wise to also try to detect the less obvious indicators of surveillance as well.The single most important indicator that a person might be conducting surveillance (on any level) is the person’s correlation to the target. If the term correlation seems a bit vague or general that is because it is. This is one of the reasons why surveillance can be quite difficult to detect – especially the higher levels of surveillance – when correlations are at their most subtle. In general, a correlation can be any act of observation, movement, signaling, communicating, or even just presence over time and distance in some kind of conjunction with the location, timing, and/or movements of the target. And though there are ways to blur and camouflage these types of correlations, except for very rare cases, there is no real way to completely eliminate them while still conducting effective physical surveillance.The best way to understand what correlations to a target might look like, and why they almost always exist when surveillance is carried out, is to experience how it actually feels to conduct surveillance, and to therefore correlate to a target oneself. After you experience how surveillance feels in the flesh, you will be much better positioned to spot people who are going through the same experience. In much the same way, casinos and fraud detection units have been known to hire ex-cheats, frauds and con artists, who have become extremely adept at detecting the very same tricks they themselves used to employ. This is one of those relatively rare situations where you can actually say that ‘it takes one to know one’ – or at least to detect one.Hostile surveillance is a process that begins by understanding the area around a target, locating potential vantage points, and understanding what kinds of people spend time at the vantage points (what they do, what they look like, etc.). A vantage point is a location from which the operative can conduct surveillance on a target, and a good surveillance vantage point is one that gives the operative access to important visual information, while allowing him/her to appear completely natural. Good vantage points might be coffee shops, park benches, crowded areas, and any environment into which the surveillance operative can naturally blend while observing the target.What makes surveillance so difficult, however, is that as seemingly normal as an operative might strive to appear, the fact will always remain that there is a constant tension – or even a contradiction – between how the surveillance operative appears and what the operative is actually doing. And it is within the scope of what the operative is actually doing – visually collecting information on the target – that most surveillance correlations are to be found. Hiding or blending in is easy if all you are trying to do is hide and blend in. But if you are also trying to visually collect information on a target, or spot a particular action or movement of a target, or observe changes and habits of a target, then as subtle as they may be, correlations to the target are almost inevitable.The simple act of observing a target is a correlation. Moving in conjunction with or following a target is another type of correlation. Paying close attention to the target at specific key moments can be a type of correlation. Signaling, gesturing, hiding, telephoning, texting, or even just checking the time in conjunction with a target’s movements or activities can also be a correlation.Another type of correlation to the target, a particularly difficult one to detect, is what is called correlation over time and/or distance. If, for example, the target is a CEO who is staying at a hotel for a week while on a business trip, a correlation can be something as subtle as an individual spending every morning at that hotel lobby, every day for the duration of that week. Even if the individual doesn’t appear to be observing, filming, or communicating as the CEO moves through the hotel lobby (there are a number of electronic tools that can make these actions very difficult to detect), the simple presence of the individual over time can be a correlation in itself. If the CEO happens to be on a multi city business trip, and the same individual in question is seen spending time in the lobby of each hotel the CEO is staying at (say, in New York, London and Tokyo), then, again, even without correlating in action, merely being present over time and distance in conjunction with the CEO can be a type of a correlation.

Surveillance Indicators

Many people tend to think that in order to detect physical surveillance, one should look for individuals who seem suspicious, out of place, or otherwise engaged in nervous observations. Though these characteristics might be observed in many situations, the very first thing that a well trained surveillance operative will learn is how to not exhibit these traits.
Some of the more subtle indicators that a person might be conducting surveillance can include (but are not limited to): observing and/or photographing the target, movements along/behind a mobile target, and communicating or even simply gesturing in conjunction with a target’s movements or actions.

To get an idea of just how subtle such indicators can be, try to imagine a targeted individual, say, a CEO, walking into a crowded restaurant for a scheduled lunch meeting with an important client. As the CEO sits down at the table, a person from the back of the crowded restaurant picks up his cellphone and types a few things into it before putting it back down. Forty five minutes later, when the CEO and his client get up and leave the restaurant, the man at the back table, who was already holding his phone, types a few things into it again. He then pays for his meal and leaves the restaurant a few minutes later. Considering the fact that most of us have our phones in our hands much of the time, one out of any number of individuals holding their phones in a busy restaurant should not seem the least bit suspicious. And yet, for a well trained observer, the timing of such a thing (at the arrival and departure of the target), in addition to the location from which this was done (a table that provides a logical vantage point), might indicate a very subtle yet real correlation to the target. Even the most casual of actions could be all it takes to communicate, take note, or even photograph, when such a target arrives, who he meets, and when he departs.

Another type of correlation is a correlation over time and distance. This correlation could be either harder or easier to detect (unfortunately, it’s usually harder), since no correlative action is necessarily detected. The correlation in this case is the mere presence of the same individual (or possibly a number of individuals) in the vicinity of the target. No direct observation, communication, photographing, movement, or even subtle correlative gestures are detected, and yet, there the the person is – over and over again in different times and places where the target just so happens to be.

The reasons why no correlative actions are being detected might be a result of the surveillance operative’s skillfulness, his/her use of covert devices, the relatively lower skill-set or operational abilities of the SD operative, or all of the above. This isn’t a matter of failure or blame (even experienced SD operatives are only human after all), but simply a question of being open to more available options when it comes to potential surveillance indicators.

One of the things that makes detecting correlation over time and distance so difficult, however, is that it’s not so much a matter of detecting the person him/herself, as it is the ability to remember or recognize that one individual out of a roomful of people, also happens to be the same individual from an earlier roomful of people a few hours ago; who was also the same individual from an even earlier street full of people yesterday. This means that an additional dimension of difficulty is added to the detection of surveillance. Real time detection of correlative actions might not be enough. There might be a need to memorize or list all the individuals who have occupied tables, benches or any other potential vantage point around the target during the day (regardless of whether or not they correlated in action), and later on, to compare those individuals to future individuals in different times and/or locations around the target. If any individuals come up as common denominators, this might indicate that a correlation over time and/or distance is happening.

There will be, I can tell you, an abundance of false positives when it comes to detecting surveillance indicators of this sort. Keep in mind that people – all people – tend to be creatures of habit. The same individual, looking out of a coffee shop window at a secured facility every morning, is worth noting to be sure, but this has to be balanced out somehow with the simple realization that every coffee shop has its regulars, who often like to sit at the same tables. And though experience, and a number of very good tools, might help clear out some of the white noise, there are no silver bullet formulas that can absolutely guarantee no false positives. One way to think about it is that you should always have more potential positives than actual ones – as long as you don’t go overboard with it. It’s true that anyone could potentially conduct surveillance, but if you end up with fifty potential surveillance operatives at any given location, then even if one of them happens to be real, you are unlikely to find the surveillance needle in the potential haystack you’ve piled up. One useful tip, at least when it comes to correlations over distance, is that if you see the same person once again, it’s a coincidence, twice again elevates it to suspicious, three times – you have a correlation. This is imperfect, to be sure, but it at least gives you something to start with.

As always – no article, book, or seminar can be said to actually teach people how to perform surveillance detection. Though some of the wording in this article might seem instructional, please keep in mind that this article is not intended to teach anyone how to execute surveillance detection operations.